It is hard for private agents to produce money that circulates at par with no questions asked about its backing. Stablecoins, digital tokens designed to maintain a stable value, are the newest iteration of privately produced money. We study stablecoins to understand how privately produced money develops a convenience yield. We document that most stablecoins have low — and often negative — convenience yields. We show that four forces help them command a larger convenience yield: aggregate factors, reputation, technology, and dollar demand. Coin-specific variation in these forces has become increasingly important, helping explain why some stablecoins gain wider adoption.
Prevailing theories of financial intermediation assume an integrated financial sector with frictionless risk sharing. However, we identify substantial risk-sharing frictions linked to intermediary specialization using currency derivatives markets as a laboratory. Using confidential supervisory data covering $25 trillion in daily bank exposures, we document imperfect hedging in banks’ FX-swap intermediation: banks rarely hedge their synthetic dollar lending with maturity-matched foreign safe assets. Intermediaries specialize in markets where they have expertise in managing the associated exposures, giving rise to cross-market variation in deviations from covered-interest parity. Our results highlight the importance of intermediary specialization and its impact on risk premia.
Digital money differs from previous forms of money in an important way: it unbundles trust. Instead of relying on a trustworthy institution to settle payments, it relies on decentralized verification, whose cost is priced separately through congestion-sensitive gas fees. This arrangement creates a novel fragility from the interaction of two opposing forces: network externalities, which make digital money more valuable as adoption rises, and congestion fees, which make it more costly to use. We show that these forces generate strategic complementarities in redemption decisions and can create runs even when digital money is backed by perfectly safe reserves.
Banks are vital suppliers of money-like safe assets, which they produce by issuing short-term liabilities and pledging collateral. But their ability to create safe assets varies over time as leverage constraints fluctuate. I write a simple model to describe private safe-asset production when intermediaries face leverage constraints. I directly measure leverage constraints using confidential supervisory data on high-frequency changes in the largest banks' repos. The collateral spread — the maturity-matched yield spread between Treasuries used as repo collateral more often and Treasuries used less often — compensates for bank leverage risk and averages about 0.5 basis points, a sizable magnitude roughly equal to 60 percent of the 5-year Treasury cheapest-to-deliver basis.
Stablecoins are a new form of private money. They are fragile but largely trade at par. How? We present a model and empirical work to examine a novel source of demand for stablecoins. Stablecoin owners are indirectly compensated for run risk by lending their coins to crypto speculators. The stablecoin can then support its $1 peg, but this arrangement links crypto speculation to traditional financial markets where stablecoins invest their reserves.
We examine whether access to the Federal Reserve’s Overnight Reverse Repo Facility (ON RRP) affects government money market fund flows during flight-to-safety episodes. We find that funds with ON RRP access serving sophisticated investors experience about a 1 percentage point increase in net daily flows over total assets during the March 2020 flight-to-safety episode relative to similar funds without access. The effect aligns with theoretical predictions and explains more than half of the inflows in those funds. Our results show that access to central bank deposit facilities amplifies flight-to-safety behavior.
Outside of financial crises, investors have little incentive to produce private information on banks’ short-term liabilities held as information-insensitive safe assets. The same does not hold during crises. We compare the information effects of different policy interventions. We measure information production using credit default swap spreads during the Global Financial Crisis and the European debt crisis. We study abnormal information production around major events and find that capital injections reduced abnormal information production while early European stress tests increased it. High levels of information production predict bank balance sheet contraction and higher government expenditures to support financial institutions.
The sale and repurchase (repo) market played a central role in the recent financial crisis. From the second quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2009, net repo financing provided to U.S. banks and broker-dealers fell by about $900 billion — more than half of its pre-crisis total. Significant details of this “run on repo” remain shrouded because many of the providers of repo finance are lightly regulated or unregulated cash pools. In this paper, we supplement the best available official data sources with a unique market survey and data from the footnotes of public companies’ quarterly filings to provide an updated picture of the dynamics of the repo run. We provide evidence that the flight of foreign financial institutions, domestic and offshore hedge funds, and other unregulated cash pools predominantly drove the run. Our analysis highlights the danger of relying exclusively on data from regulated institutions, which would miss the most important parts of the run.
Banks can use the discount window to fend off a run by prepositioning assets with the Fed and borrowing against them. Following the March 2023 bank runs, policymakers have considered mandatory prepositioning, arguably the largest update to the lender-of-last-resort toolkit in over a century. We study the forces that shape the largest banks’ prepositioning. We show that run-prone uninsured-deposit flows causally drive prepositioning and that banks face a pre-positioning stigma, even absent borrowing. Prepositioning is no panacea — banks still need good assets to borrow against — but it can help at the margin.
Corporate cash piles vary across companies and over time. A firm’s cash holding is an implicit position in a low-return asset that is correlated across firms. Cash generates variation in beta estimates. We show how investors can hedge out the cash on firms’ balance sheets when making portfolio choices. We decompose stock betas into components that depend on the firm’s cash holding, return on cash, and cash-hedged return. Common asset pricing premia — size, value, and momentum — have large implicit cash positions. Portfolios of cash-hedged premia often have higher Sharpe ratios because firms’ cash returns are correlated.
We study aggregate collateral demand and its effect on the Treasury convenience yield. Supervisory data reveal over $3.4 trillion of collateral temporarily removed from circulation in collateral sinks. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in sunk collateral raises convenience yields by one standard deviation. We trace the effect to lower short-term yields and wider spreads on collateral-heavy arbitrage trades. The rapidly growing collateral swap market alleviates collateral tightness on average but exacerbates it under stress. We estimate 70% of the March 2020 convenience yield increase was due to impaired collateral intermediation.
Post-crisis reforms changed the location of safe-asset production. I propose a pair of tests to identify who issues safe assets and which safe-asset issuers opportunistically time issuance when the price of safe assets is high. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system is a newly crucial safe-asset producer. FHLB debt issuance is an important determinant of the price of safe assets, and FHLB debt issuance responds to day-to-day fluctuations in safe-asset demand — measured via the convenience yield. FHLBs issue more after an unexpected increase in the convenience yield, and an unexpectedly large FHLB issue decreases the convenience yield. The FHLBs’ ability to produce safe assets depends on their implicit government backing, a potential source of concern for future policymakers.
